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Abstract
In the tollbooth problem, we are given a tree T = (V,E) with n edges, and a
set of m customers, each of whom is interested in purchasing a path on the tree.
Each customer has a fixed budget, and the objective is to price the edges of T
such that the total revenue made by selling the paths to the customers that can
afford them is maximized. An important special case of this problem, known as
the highway problem, is when T is restricted to be a line.
For the tollbooth problem, we present a randomized O(log n)-approximation,
improving on the current best O(logm)-approximation. We also study a special
case of the tollbooth problem, when all the paths that customers are interested
in purchasing go towards a fixed root of T. In this case, we present an algorithm
that returns a (1− ǫ)-approximation, for any ǫ > 0, and runs in quasi-polynomial
time. On the other hand, we rule out the existence of an FPTAS by showing
that even for the line case, the problem is strongly NP-hard. Finally, we show
that in the coupon model, when we allow some items to be priced below zero to
improve the overall profit, the problem becomes even APX-hard.
1 Introduction
Consider the problem of pricing the bandwidth along the links of a network such that
the revenue obtained from customers interested in buying bandwidth along certain
paths in the network is maximized. Suppose that each customer declares a set of
paths she is interested in buying, and a maximum amount she is is willing to pay for
each path. The network service provider’s objective is to assign single prices to the
links such that the total revenue from customers who can afford to purchase their
paths is maximized. Recently, numerous papers have appeared on the computational
complexity of such pricing problems [1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 11, 15, 16, 8].
A special case of this problem, where each customer is interested in purchasing
only a single path (single-minded), and where there is no upper bound on the number
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of customers purchasing each link (unlimited supply) was studied by Guruswami et
al. [15], under the name of tollbooth problem. The authors of [15] showed that the
problem is already APX-hard when the network is restricted to be a tree, and also
presented a polynomial time algorithm for the case when all paths start at a certain
root of the tree. In [15], the authors also studied the highway problem, a further
restriction where the tree is a path, and gave polynomial time algorithms when either
the budgets are bounded and integral, or all paths have a bounded length.
In this paper, we continue the study of these problems. For the tollbooth prob-
lem, the best known approximation factor was O(log n+ logm), where n and m are
respectively the number of edges of the tree and the number of customers. This result
applies in fact for general sets [15], and not necessarily paths of a network, and even in
the non single-minded case [4]. Very recently, and more generally, Cheung and Swamy
[8] gave an algorithm that, given any LP-based α-approximation algorithm for max-
imizing the social welfare under limited supply, returns a solution with profit within
a factor of α log umax of the maximum, where umax is the maximum supply of an
item. In particular, this gives an O(logm)-approximation for the tollbooth problem
on trees. In this paper, we give an O(log n)-approximation which is an improvement
over the O(logm) since n ≤ 3m can be always assumed. We also show that if all the
paths are going towards a certain root, then a (1− ǫ)-approximation can be obtained
in quasi-polynomial time. This result extends a recently developed quasi-PTAS [10]
for the highway problem, and uses essentially the same technique. However, there is a
number of technical issues that have to be resolved for this technique to work on trees;
most notably is the use of the Separator Theorem for trees, and the modification of
the price-guessing strategy to allow only for one-sided guesses.
The existence of a quasi-PTAS for the highway problem indicates that a PTAS or
even an FPTAS is still a possibility, since the problem was only known to be weakly
NP-hard [6]. In the last section of this paper, we show that the highway problem is
indeed strongly NP-hard and hence admits no FPTAS unless P=NP.
Balcan et al. [3] considered a model in which some items can be priced below
zero (in the form of a discount) so that the overall profit is maximized. They gave a
4-approximation for the uniform budgets case, and a quasi-PTAS for a special case
in which there is an optimal pricing that has only a bounded number of negatively
priced items. Here we show that the existence of a quasi-PTAS in the general case is
highly unlikely, by showing that the problem is APX-hard.
In the next section, we give a formal definition of the problem. In Section 3, we
give a O(log n) approximation for trees and in Section 4 we give a quasi-PTAS for
the case of uncrossing paths. We conclude in Section 6.
2 The tollbooth problem on trees
2.1 Notation
Let T = (V,E) be a tree. We assume that we are given a (multi)set of paths I =
{I1, . . . , Im}, defined on the set of edges E, where Ij = [sj , tj] ⊆ E is the path
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connecting sj and tj in T. For Ij ∈ I, we denote by B(Ij) ∈ R+ the budget of path
Ij, i.e., the maximum amount of money customer j is willing to pay for purchasing
path Ij. In the tollbooth problem, denoted henceforth by Tb, the objective is to assign
a price p(e) ∈ R+ for each edge e ∈ E, and to find a subset J ⊆ I, so as to maximize
∑
I∈J
p(I) (1)
subject to the budget constraints
p(I) ≤ B(I), for all I ∈ J , (2)
where, for I ∈ I, p(I) =
∑
e∈I p(e).
For a node w ∈ V , let I[w] ⊆ I be the set of paths that pass through w. In
section 4, we will assume that the tree is rooted at some node r ∈ V . The depth of T,
denoted d(T), is the length of the longest path from the root r to a leaf. For a node
w ∈ V , we denote by T(w), the subtree of T rooted at w (excluding the path from
the parent of w to r), and for a subtree T′ of T we denote by V (T′), E(T′) and I(T′)
the vertex set, edge set, and set of intervals contained completely in T′, respectively.
2.2 Preliminaries
In the following sections, we denote by p∗ : E 7→ R+ an optimal set of prices, and
by Opt ⊆ I the set of intervals purchased in this optimum solution. For a subset of
intervals I ′ ⊆ I, and a price function p : E 7→ R+, we denote by p(I
′) =
∑
I∈I′ p(I)
the total price of intervals in I ′.
It easy to see that n ≤ 3m may be assumed without loss of generality. Indeed,
if we root the tree at some vertex r, then for every vertex v ∈ V , we may assume
that there is either an interval I ∈ I beginning at v or an interval I ∈ I that passes
through two different children of v; otherwise, every interval through v must contain
its parent u (unless v = r in which case all edges incident to r can be contracted),
and hence we can contract the edge e = {u, v} and increase by p∗(e) the prices of
each the edges {v, v′} for each child v′ of v.
Let ǫ > 0 be a given constant.
Proposition 1 ([10]) Let p∗ be an optimal solution for a given instance of Tb, and
ǫ > 0 be a given constant. Then there exists a price function p˜ : E 7→ R+ for which
(i) p˜(e) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , P}, for every e ∈ E, where P = nm/ǫ,
(ii) p˜(I) ≤ B(I)1+ǫ , for every I ∈ Opt, and
(iii) p˜(Opt) ≥ (1− 2ǫ)p∗(Opt).
We shall call the set of prices p˜ satisfying the conditions of Proposition 1, ǫ-optimal
prices.
We will make use of the following well-known separator result for trees.
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Proposition 2 Let T = (V,E) be a tree. Then there exists a node v (called sepa-
rator node) with the following property: Let s1, . . . , sr be the sizes of the components
obtained by deleting v from T, then there is a subset S ⊆ [r] such that
⌊
n
3
⌋ ≤
∑
i∈S
si ≤ ⌈
2n
3
⌉. (3)
Such a separator can be found in linear time.
This gives a recursive partitioning of T in the following standard way: Let v0 be
a separator vertex in T and T1, . . . , Tr be the components of T − v0. Recursively, find
separator vertices v1, . . . vr inT1, . . . ,Tr. We say that node v0 has level(v0) = 1, nodes
v1, . . . , vr have level 2, and in general if node v is a separator vertex in the subtree T
′
obtained by deleting one-higher level separator vertex v′ then level(v) = level(v′)+ 1.
By (3), the maximum number of levels k in this decomposition is at most log3/2 n.
We shall denote by N (T) the set of separator nodes used in the full decomposition
of T.
3 An O(logn) approximation for the tollbooth problem
on trees
In this section, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1 There is a deterministic O(log n)-approximation algorithm for Tb.
The proof goes along the same lines used in [2] to obtain an O(log n)-approximation
for the highway problem. The algorithm consists of 3 main steps: Partitioning,
“randomized cut”, and then dynamic programming. We can then derandomize it to
obtain a deterministic algorithm.
We say that the given set of paths I is rooted, if all the paths in I start at some
node r, called the root of T. We will also make use of the following theorem.
Theorem 2 ([15]) The tollbooth problem on rooted paths can be solved in polynomial
time using dynamic programming.
For i = 1, . . . , k, let
I(i) = {I ∈ I : i is the smallest level of a separator vertex v ∈ N (T) contained in I}.
Then I = ∪i∈[k]I(i) and I∩J = ∅ for all I, J ∈ I(i) that contain distinct separators at
level i. Let (Opt, p∗) be an optimal solution. Then, p∗(Opt) =
∑k
i=1 p
∗(Opt∩I(i)).
Thus if we solve k independent problems on each of the sets I(i), i = 1, . . . , k, and take
the solution with maximum revenue, we get a solution of value at least p∗(Opt)/k.
Thus it remains to show the following result.
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Theorem 3 Let v be a node of T, and suppose that all the paths in I go through v.
Then a solution (J , p) of expected value p(J ) ≥ p∗(Opt)/8 can be found in polynomial
time.
Proof. Let v1, . . . , vr be the nodes adjacent to v. Note that each path I ∈ I can be
divided into two sub-paths starting at v; we denote them by I1 and I2. We use the
following procedure.
1. Let X ⊆ {v1, . . . , vr} be a subset obtained by picking each vi randomly and
independently with probability 1/2.
2. Let I ′ = {Ij ∈ I : j ∈ {1, 2}, Ij contains exactly one vertex of X}.
3. Use dynamic programming (cf. Theorem 2) to get an optimal solution (J , p)
on the instance defined by I ′ and the tree T ′ with root v and sub-trees rooted
at the children in X.
4. Extend p with zeros on all the other arcs not in T ′, and return (J , p).
Let (Opt, p∗) be an optimal solution. We now argue that the solution returned by
this algorithm has expected revenue of p∗(Opt)/8. Clearly, for every I ∈ I, either
p∗(I1) ≥ p
∗(I)/2 or p∗(I2) ≥ p
∗(I)/2; let us call this more profitable part by I∗.
Then
∑
I∈Opt p
∗(I∗) ≥ p
∗(Opt)/2. Let Opt′ = {I ∈ Opt : I∗ contains exactly
one vertex of X}. Note that with probability at least 1/4 each I ∈ Opt has I∗
intersecting the random set X in exactly one vertex. In particular,
E[p∗(Opt′)] =
∑
I∈Opt
E[p∗(I∗)] ≥
1
4
∑
I∈Opt
p∗(I∗) ≥
1
8
p∗(Opt).
Since what our procedure returns is at least as profitable as this quantity, the theorem
follows. 
The randomized algorithm above can be derandomized using the method of pair-
wise independence [17, 18, 2].
4 Uncrossing paths
Here we assume that the tree is rooted at some node r ∈ V , and that paths in I have
the following uncrossing property: If I = [s, t] ∈ I then t lies on the path [s, r]. This
property implies that once paths in I meet they cannot diverge.
In the course of the solution, we shall consider the following generalized version
of the problem: Given intervals as above, and also a function h : I 7→ R+, find J ⊆ I
and a pricing p : E 7→ R+, satisfying (2) and maximizing
∑
I∈J h(I, p).
Given a price function p : E 7→ R+ and a node w ∈ V , the accumulative price
at any node u on the path [w, r] with respect to w is defined as p([w, u]). Obviously,
this monotonically increases as u moves towards the root. In this section we prove
the following theorem.
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Theorem 4 There is a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme for the tollbooth
problem with uncrossing paths.
In the following, we fix K = ⌈log(nP )/ log(1 + ǫ)⌉.
Definition 5 (ǫ-Relative pricings) Let w ∈ V be a given node of T, and 0 ≤ k ≤ K
and 0 ≤ k′ ≤ 2 log3/2 n be given integers. We call any selection of k nodes u1, . . . , uk ∈
V , k indices −∞ ≤ i1 < · · · < ik ≤ K, and k
′ values p1, . . . , pk′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , nP},
such that w, u1, u2, . . . , uk, r lie on the path [w, r] in that order, an ǫ-relative pricing
w.r.t. w, and denote it by (w, k, k′, u1, . . . , uk, i1, . . . , ik, p1, . . . , pk′).
The total number of possible ǫ-relative pricings with respect to a given w ∈ V is at
most
L = (d(T )K)K(nP + 1)2 log3/2 n, (4)
which is mpolylog(m) for every fixed ǫ > 0.
Definition 6 (Consistent pricings) Let R = (w, k, k′, u1, . . . , uk, i1, . . . , ik, p1, . . . , pk′)
be an ǫ-relative pricing w.r.t. node w ∈ V , L = {s1, . . . , sk′} be the set of separators
from N (T) on the path from (w, r], and p : E 7→ R+ be a pricing of E. We say that
R is ǫ-consistent with p and L if
(C1) for j = 1, . . . , k − 1, (1 + ǫ)ij ≤ p([w, u]) ≤ (1 + ǫ)ij+1 if u lies in the interval
[uj , uj+1) (excluding uj+1),
(C2) for j = 1, . . . , k′, p([w, sj ]) = pj.
Lemma 1 Let p˜ : E 7→ R+ be an ǫ-optimal pricing for a given instance of Tb,
w ∈ V be an arbitrary node, and L = {s1, . . . , sk′} be the set of separators in N (T)
on the path from (w, r]. Then there exists an ǫ-relative pricing R w.r.t. w, that is
ǫ-consistent with p˜ and L.
With every ǫ-relative pricing R, we can associate a system of linear inequalities,
denoted by S(R), on a set of E variables {p(e) : e ∈ E}, consisting of the constraints
(C1) and (C2), together with the non-negativity constraints p(e) ≥ 0. The feasible
set for this system gives the set of all possible pricings with which R is ǫ-consistent.
For two systems of inequalities S1, S2, we denote by S1 ∧ S2 the system obtained by
combining their inequalities.
Let R = (w, k, k′, u1, . . . , uk, i1, . . . , ik, i
′
1, . . . , i
′
k′) be an ǫ-relative pricing w.r.t. a
node w ∈ V . Given an interval I ∈ I[w], we associate a value v(I,R) to I, defined
with respect to R as follows: Let j(I) be the largest index such that uij(I) is contained
in I. Then, define v(I,R) = (1 + ǫ)j(I). For a subset of intervals I ′ ⊆ I, we define,
as usual, v(I ′, R) =
∑
I∈I′ v(I,R). It follows that for any ǫ-relative pricing R w.r.t.
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a node w ∈ V , any p : E 7→ R+ with which R is consistent, and any I = [s, t] ∈ I[w],
we have
v(I,R) ≤ p([w, t]) ≤ (1 + ǫ)v(I,R). (5)
Decomposition into two subproblems. Let w ∈ N (T) be a separator node.
Then T can be decomposed into two subtrees TL = (VL, EL) and TR = (VR, ER),
such that the root r ∈ VR and w is the root of TL. We define two Tb instances
(TL,IL) and (TR,IR) where:
I0 = {[s, t] ∈ I[w] : s ∈ VL and t ∈ VR},
IL = {[s, t] ∈ I : s, t ∈ VL} ∪ {[s,w] : [s, t] ∈ I0},
IR = {[s, t] ∈ I : s, t ∈ VR}.
In other words, the intervals passing through w, crossing from TL to TR are truncated
in TL while all other intervals remain the same
1. Note that from the choice of w, we
have max{|V (TL)|, |V (TR)|} ≤
2n
3 +1, and both instances (TL,IL) and (TR,IR) are
of the uncrossing type, with roots w and r, respectively.
The algorithm is shown in Figure 1. It is initially called with an empty S, and
with h(I) = 0 for all I ∈ I. The procedure iterates over all ǫ-relative pricings R,
consistent with S, w.r.t. the middle edge e∗, then recurses on the subsets of intervals
to the left and right of e∗. Intervals crossing from TL to TR will be truncated and
their values will be charged to TL; hence the corresponding budgets are reduced, and
the corresponding h-values are increased.
Solving the base case. At the lowest level of recursion (either line 1 or 4), we
have to solve a linear program defined by the system S. Note that the system may
contain constraints on variables outside the current set of edges E of the current tree
T (resulting from previous nodes of the recursion tree). However, we can reduce this
LP to one that involves only variables in E. Indeed, any constraint that involves a
variable not in E, has the form L ≤ p([w, u]) ≤ U , where u ∈ V (T), and w 6∈ V (T)
is a separator node such that there is another separator node w′ ∈ V (T) on the path
from w to u. Then when w′ was considered in the recursion, a constraint of the form
p([w,w′)] = q, for some value q, was appended to S (recall (C2) in the definition
of consistent pricings). Now, we can replace the first constraint by the equivalent
constraint L− q ≤ p([w′, u]) ≤ U − q, which only involves variables from E. This is
exactly what procedure REDUCE(S, ·) does in lines 2 and 6.
When the procedure returns, we get a pricing p : E 7→ R+ and a set of intervals
J ⊆ I which can be purchased under this pricing.
Theorem 4 follows from the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2 Algorithm Tb runs in quasi-polynomial time in m, for any fixed ǫ > 0.
Lemma 3 For any ǫ > 0, Algorithm Tb returns a pricing p and a set of intervals J
such that p(I) ≤ B(I) for all I ∈ J and p(J ) ≥ (1− 3ǫ)p∗(Opt).
1throughout, we will make the implicit assumption that each interval has an ”identity”; so, for
instance, IL ∩ I0 will be used to denote the set {I ∈ I0 : I = [s, t] and [s, w] ∈ IL}
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Algorithm Tb(T, I, r, B, h,S):
Input: An uncrossing Tb instance (T = (V,E), I) with root r,
budgets and values B, h : I 7→ R+, and a feasible system of inequalities S
Output: A pricing p : E 7→ R+ and a subset J ⊆ I
1. if |I| = 0, then
2. S ′ ←REDUCE(S, E)
3. return (p, ∅), where p is any feasible solution of S ′
4. if d(T) = 1, then
5. foreach edge e of T do
6. S ′ ←REDUCE(S, {e})
7. p(e)← argmax{
∑
I∈I: p′≤B(I)(h(I) + p
′) : p′ satisfies S ′}
8. J (e)← {I ∈ I : B(I) ≥ p(e)}
9. return ((p(e) : e ∈ E),
⋃
e∈E J (e))
10. let w be a separator node of T and TL,TR, I0, IL, IR be as defined above
11. for every ǫ-relative pricing R w.r.t. w for which S ∧ S(R) is feasible do
12. foreach I ∈ I0 do
13. B(I)← B(I)− (1 + ǫ)v(I, R)
14. h(I)← h(I) + v(I, R)
15. (p1,J1)← Tb(TL, IL, w,B, h,S)
16. (p2,J2)← Tb(TR, IR, r, B, h,S ∧ S(R))
17. let p be the pricing defined by p(e) = p1(e) if e ∈ EL and p(e) = p1(e) if e ∈ ER
18. J ← J1 ∪ J2
19. record (p,J )
20. return the recorded solution with largest p(J ) + h(J ) value
Figure 1: The procedure for computing ǫ-approximate prices.
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5 Hardness of the highway problem
5.1 Strong NP-hardness in the standard model
Recall that the highway problem is the special case of the tollbooth problem when the
underlying graph is a path. In [15], Guruswami, et al. considered the highway problem
and gave a polynomial time algorithm when the maximum budget is bounded by a
constant, and all the budgets are integral. Balcan and Blum [2] gave a constant factor
approximation algorithm when all intervals have the same length. Breist and Krysta
[6] showed that the problem is weakly NP-hard. In [14], Grigoriev et al. showed
that a restricted version of the problem when the prices are required to satisfy a
monotonicity condition remains weakly NP-hard. In this section, we show that the
problem is strongly NP-hard by a reduction from MAX-2-SAT.
Consider a MAX-2-SAT instance with n variables {x1, · · · , xn} and m clauses
{C1, · · · , Cm}. Let the variables be numbered 1, · · · , n. We construct a gadget for
each variable and each clause. We start by describing the gadgets in our construction.
5.1.1 Variable Gadget
The variable gadget for each variable consists of two copies of the following basic gadget
and a consistency gadget. We first describe the basic gadget, and then describe the
consistency gadget and the construction of a variable gadget.
Basic Gadget: The basic gadget consists of 4 edges e1, · · · , e4, and 4 types of inter-
vals A,B,C and D. There are 4 intervals each of type A and B, labeled a1, · · · , a4,
and b1, · · · , b4 respectively. The intervals ai = bi = [ei], i = 1, · · · 4. The intervals
a1, · · · , a4 have budgets of 1, 2, 2, 1 respectively, and the intervals b1, · · · , b4 have bud-
gets 2, 1, 1, 2 respectively. There are 2 type C intervals, c1 and c2, with c1 = [e1, e2],
and c2 = [e3, e4]. These intervals have a budget of 3. There are two intervals of
type D, d1 = d2 = [e2, e3] with d1 having a budget of 4, and d2, a budget of 2. The
basic gadget is shown in Figure 2. We now show that there are exactly two price
assignments for {e1, · · · , e4} that gives us optimum profit.
Lemma 4 The maximum profit that can be obtained from a basic gadget is 18, and
there are exactly two sets of prices that achieve this profit.
We call the price assignment (1, 2, 2, 1) to the edges e1, · · · , e4 respectively, a
TRUE assignment, and the price assignment (2, 1, 1, 2) to the edges e1, · · · , e4 re-
spectively, a FALSE assignment. The variable gadget is constructed on 8n+ 1 edges
(e4n, e4n−1, · · · , e1, h, f1, · · · , f4n), where n is the number of variables in the MAX-2-
SAT instance. Each variable gadget consists of two copies of the basic gadget, along
with a consistency gadget. The consistency gadget ensures that the two basic gadgets
have the same price assignment, i.e., both set to TRUE, or both set to FALSE. More
formally, let (x1, · · · , xn) be an order on the variables of the MAX-2-SAT instance.
Then, the gadget for variable xi, consists of two basic gadgets, B
1
i and B
2
i . B
1
i con-
sists of intervals (customers) interested in the edges e4i−3, · · · , e4i and B
2
i consists of
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e4e1 e2 e3
2 2 1
a1 a2 a3 a4
2 1 1 2
b1 b2 b3 b4
3 3
c1 c2
4
d2
2
d
A
B
C
D
1
Figure 2: A basic gadget. The gadget consists of 4 edges, and 4 types of intervals
A,B,C and D. The interval labels are shown below each interval, and the budgets
are shown above each interval.
intervals interested in the edges f4i−3, · · · , f4i. Finally, the intervals ensuring con-
sistency of the gadget for variable xi spans from e4i−1, · · · , f4i−3. The consistency
gadget consists of a single interval that has a budget of mn2 + 6(2i− 2) + 6. Finally,
we add a new type of interval, called a type H interval that is interested only in the
edge h, and has a budget of mn2.
Figure 3 shows the arrangement of the variable gadgets. We now show that the
consistency intervals do their job. i.e., if for a variable gadget, B1i and B
2
i have
different price assignments, we obtain a smaller profit than when they are the same.
.
 
.
 
.
. . . . . .
h
mn2 + 12 + 6
mn2 + 6
mn2
x2 x2x1 x1
H
f8e7 e6 e5e8 e4 e3 e2 e1 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7
Figure 3: The variable gadget.
Lemma 5 The maximum profit of 2mn2 + 6(2i− 2) + 6 + 36 from a variable gadget
and the interval h is achieved only when both the basic gadgets corresponding to a
variable are consistent, and the type H interval purchases edge h at a price of mn2.
We will create several copies of the basic gadgets, the consistency gadgets for each
variable as well as several copies of the H interval to ensure that in an optimum price
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Clause Interval Budget
(xi ∨ xj) [e4i−3, f4j−3] mn
2 + 6(i+ j − 2) + 3
(xi ∨ xj) [e4i−1, f4j−3] mn
2 + 6(i+ j − 2) + 6
(xi ∨ xj) [e4i−3, f4j−1] mn
2 + 6(i+ j − 2) + 6
(xi ∨ xj) [e4i−1, f4j−1] mn
2 + 6(i+ j − 2) + 9
Figure 4: This table shows the lengths and budgets of the intervals making up a
clause gadget for the four different kinds of clauses.
assignment, the basic gadgets are consistent, and the reduction goes through. But
before we do this, we describe the clause gadgets.
5.1.2 Clause Gadgets
The clause gadget for a clause of variables xi and xj runs between the basic gadget
B1i and B
2
j . There are four types of clause gadgets corresponding to the four types of
clauses. Each clause gadget consists of one interval. These intervals have the property
that we obtain a certain revenue from the clause interval if and only if the clause is
satisfied; otherwise we obtain nothing. The clause gadgets for the four types of clauses
are shown in Table 4 and in Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9 in the Appendix.
We say that a pricing is consistent if for every variable, the price assignment to
the two basic gadgets of the variable gadget are both TRUE or both FALSE, and the
consistency intervals spend their entire budgets.
Lemma 6 Consider a clause C consisting of variables xi and xj and a consistent
price assignment to the edges. Then, the intervals corresponding to C will be able to
purchase their desired edges if and only if the corresponding truth assignment to the
variables satisfies the clause C.
5.1.3 NP-hardness
We now describe the final reduction. As mentioned earlier, we have to create copies of
the variable gadget, consistency gadget and theH interval for the proof to go through.
We make T copies of each basic gadget, of each consistency gadget, and of the H
interval, where any value of T , larger than m2n3 will suffice for the proof. Observe
that for a variable gadget again, the profit maximizing prices achieve consistency of
the variable gadget, and making T copies of the H intervals ensures that the price of
the edge h is set to mn2.
Theorem 7 The highway problem is strongly NP-hard.
5.2 APX-hardness in the discount model
Theorem 8 The highway problem with negative prices is APX-hard, even restricted
to instances in which one edge is shared by all customers.
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1x B=2 2x B=1 and 1x B=3 10x B=1 and 10x B=2
v0
Figure 5: Reduction: Each edges e is partitioned in edges e1 (fat) and e2 (dotted).
Which is which is arbitrary. The notation 1x B=2 means that there is one customer
with budget 2 on this type of edge.
Proof. We will show that the problem is equivalent to a pricing problem on
bipartite graphs and prove that the latter problem is APX-hard. Assume we are
given an instance of the highway problem in which edge e is contained in each of
the intervals. We split edge e by adding a node v0 on e. This has no effect on the
problem. We construct a bipartite graph H with one set consisting of the points left
of v0 and the other set consisting of the points right of v0. Now, an interval containing
e becomes an edge in the bipartite graph. The items are the vertices and a customer
is interested in the two items on the vertices of its edge. Given a pricing p for the
highway instance, we define the pricing qp of H by letting the price of a vertex v in
H be the cumulative price p([v0, v]). Conversely, for any pricing q of the vertices of
H there is a corresponding pricing p of the highway problem such that q = qp.
We prove that the pricing problem on bipartite graphs is APX-hard by a reduction
from maxcut on 3-regular graphs. Given a 3-regular graph G = (V,E), we make it
bipartite by placing an extra vertex ve on every edge e, dividing it in two new edges e1
and e2. For e1 there is one customer with budget 2 and for e2 there are two customers
with budget 1 and one customer with budget 3. We define one extra vertex v0 and
define for each v ∈ V an edge av = (v, v0). For each such edge av there are ten
customers with budget 1 and ten customers with budget 2. The bipartite graph
partitions into V and the new vertices V ′ = {ve | e ∈ E}∪ {v0}. (To enhance reading
we write prices and budgets in decimal and amounts of customers in words.)
Consider any pricing p of the bipartite graph. We may assume that p(v0) = 0
since subtracting p(v0) from all vertices in V
′ and adding p(v0) to all vertices in V
does not change the profit. We will have to take into account though that prices may
be negative.
Next, we argue that in any optimal solution the price p(v) of any vertex v ∈ V
is either 1 or 2. Denote by p(e) the profit we get from the customer on e1 plus the
three customers on e2. It is easy to see that 3 ≤ p(e) ≤ 5 for any edge e. Suppose
p(v) = α /∈ {1, 2}. If α > 2 or α ≤ 0 then the profit on av is 0. By changing the price
to p(v) = 2 the profit becomes ten times 2 is 20. The maximum profit on any of the
three adjacent edges e is 5. Hence, we gain 20 and loose at most 15. Now assume
0 < α < 1. We raise the price of v to price p(v) = 1 and reduce the price on the
vertices ve by 1−α for each of the three adjacent edges e of v in G. The 20 customers
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on av add an extra 20(1− α) to the profit. No other customer sees an increase of its
bundle price and at most 9 customers will see a reduction of the bundle price. Hence,
we loose at most 9(1 − α) on them. Now assume 1 < α < 2. We raise the price to
p(v) = 2 and reduce the price on the vertices ve of adjacent edges e by 2 − α. The
argument is the same: We gain 10(2− α) and loose at most 9(2− α) since at most 9
customers will see their bundle price drop.
We showed that there is an optimal pricing in which p(v0) = 0 and p(v) ∈ {1, 2}
for all v ∈ V . Next we prove that there is a cut of size k in G if and only if the
maximum profit is 20|V | + 4|E| + k. Given a cut of size k we price the vertices on
one side 1 and on the other side 2. Now consider an edge e = (v,w) ∈ E with
p(v) = p(w) = 1. We can get a profit p(e) = 4 by setting p(ve) = 0 or p(ve) = 1.
This is also the maximum profit possible. Similarly, if p(v) = p(w) = 2 then we
can get the maximum profit p(e) = 4 by setting p(ve) = 0. Finally, if p(v) = 1 and
p(w) = 2 then we can get the maximum possible profit p(e) = 5 by setting p(ve) = 0
or p(ve) = 1, depending on how we chose e1 and e2. From the customers on edges
adjacent to v0 we get the maximum profit of 20 per edge. The total profit is exactly
20|V |+5k+4(|E|−k) = 20n+4|E|+k and this is maximum possible if the maximum
cut is k. The reduction is gap-preserving since 3|V | = 2|E| and |E| ≤ 2k. 
In the reduction we showed that there always is an optimal pricing of the bipartite
graph with only non-negative prices. Hence, the bipartite graph pricing problem
remains APX-hard if we restrict to non-negative prices.
Corollary 1 The graph pricing problem is APX-hard on bipartite graphs and all
budgets in {1, 2, 3}. This holds for the non-negative version as well as for the version
with negative prices allowed.
Guruswami et al. [15] show that the graph-pricing problem is APX-hard even if all
budgets are 1. Note that the bipartite case is trivially solved in that case by setting
a price of 1 to all items on one side.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an O(log n)-approximation algorithm for the tollbooth
problem on trees, which is better than the upper bound currently known for the
general problem. Improving this bound is an interesting open problem. One plausible
direction towards this is to use as a subroutine, the quasi-polynomial time algorithm
for the case of uncrossing paths. Such techniques have been used before, for example
for the multicut problem on trees [12]. However, it is unclear how a general instance of
the Tb problem can be decomposed into a set of problems of the uncrossing type. For
the highway problem, the strong NP-hardness presented in this paper shows that the
problem is almost closed, modulo improving the running time from quasi-polynomial
to polynomial.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Let R = (w, k, k′, u1, . . . , uk, i1, . . . , ik, p1, . . . , pk′) be defined as
follows: write u0 = w and i0 = −∞, and let ij and uj , for j = 1, 2, . . ., be respectively
the smallest non-negative index and the closest node to uj−1 on the path [uj−1, r]
with (1 + ǫ)ij−1 < p˜([w, uj ]) ≤ (1 + ǫ)
ij ; k will be the largest such index j. Finally,
for j = 1, . . . , k′, let pj = p([w, sj ]). Note that k ≤ K since (1 + ǫ)
k ≤ nP , and
k′ ≤ 2 log3/2 n since the number of separators on the path from any node to the root
is at most 2 log3/2 n. 
Proof of Lemma 2. The number of possible ǫ-relative pricing is at most L, given
in (4). This gives the recurrence
T (n) ≤ poly(n,m) + 2L · T (
2n
3
).
for the running time. Thus T (n) ≤ LO(logn) poly(m) and the lemma follows. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Let (pT,JT) be the solution returned by the algorithm when
the input is (T,IT, rT, BT, hT,ST). We show by induction on the depth of the
recursion tree that, if there exists a pricing p′
T
satisfying ST, and a set J
′
T
such that
p′
T
(I) ≤ BT(I)/(1 + ǫ) for all I ∈ J
′
T
, then
(i) pT(I) ≤ BT(I) for all I ∈ JT, and pT is feasible for ST; and
(ii) pT(JT) + hT(JT) ≥
p′
T
(J ′
T
)
1+ǫ + hT(J
′
T
).
The statement of the theorem follows from (i) and (ii) by taking, at the highest
level where hT(I) = 0 for all I, p
′
T
= p˜ (an ǫ-optimal pricing) and J ′
T
= Opt.
Base case. At a leaf of the recursion tree, we either have |I| = 0 in which case (i)
and (ii) are trivially satisfied, or d(T) = 1 in which case (i) and the stronger version
of (ii), pT(JT) + h(JT) ≥ p
′
T
(J ′
T
) + hT(J
′
T
), are insured by the computation in line
7.
General recursion level. Let w,TL,TR,I0,IL,IR be as defined in line 10 at the
current level, and p1, p2,J1 and J2 the returned pricings and sets at lines 15 and
16. Let RT be an ǫ-relative pricing consistent with p
′
T
. Then the restrictions p′
TL
and p′
TR
of p′
T
on TL and TR satisfy, respectively, STL and STR . Moreover, for
any I ∈ J ′
T
∩ (IL \ I0), we have p
′
TL
(I) ≤
BTL(I)
1+ǫ ; for any I ∈ J
′
T
∩ IR, we have
p′
TR
(I) ≤
BTR(I)
1+ǫ ; and for any I = [s, t] ∈ J
′
T
∩ I0, we have p
′
TL
(I) = p′
T
([s,w]) =
p′
T
([s, t]) − p′
T
([w, t]) ≤ p′
T
([s, t]) − v(I,RT) ≤
BT(I)
1+ǫ − v(I,RT) =
BTL (I)
1+ǫ , where
the first inequality follow from (5), and the last equation follows from line 13 of the
procedure. Thus we can apply the induction hypothesis to the two subproblems, and
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hence get that
p1(I) ≤ BTL(I) for all I ∈ J1, (6)
p2(I) ≤ BTR(I) for all I ∈ J2, (7)
p1(J1) + hTL(J1) ≥
p′
TL
(J ′
T
∩ IL)
1 + ǫ
+ hTL(J
′
T
∩ IL), (8)
p2(J2) + hTR(J2) ≥
p′
TR
(J ′
T
∩ IR)
1 + ǫ
+ hTR(J
′
T
∩ IR), (9)
and both p1 and p2, and hence pT, satisfy ST. By (6) and (7), we have pT(I) ≤ BT(I)
for all I ∈ J1 ∪J2 \ I0. By (6) and line 13 of the procedure, we also have p1([s,w]) ≤
BT(I)− (1 + ǫ)v(I,RT) for all I = [s, t] ∈ I0 ∩ J1. Since p2 satisfies S(RT) (c.f. line
16), and hence is ǫ-consistent with RT, we get by (5) that p2([w, t]) ≤ (1+ ǫ)v(I,RT)
for all I = [s, t] ∈ I0. Combining this with the above inequality gives pT(I) =
p1[s,w] + p2[w, t] ≤ BT(I) for all I = [s, t] ∈ I0 ∩ J1, and hence proves (i).
Now we prove (ii). We have the following: p′
TL
(J ′
T
∩ IL \ I0) = p
′
T
(J ′T ∩IL \ I0),
hTL(J
′
T ∩IL \I0) = hT(J
′
T ∩IL \I0), p
′
TR
(J ′
T
∩ IR) = p
′
T
(J ′T ∩IR), hTR(J
′
T
∩ IR) =
hT(J
′
T ∩ IR), and
p′TL(J
′
T ∩ I0) =
∑
I=[s,t]∈J ′
T
∩I0
p′T([s,w]),
hTL(J
′
T ∩ I0) =
∑
I=[s,t]∈J ′
T
∩I0
hT([s, t]) +
∑
I=[s,t]∈J ′
T
∩I0
v(I,RT),
≥
∑
I∈J ′
T
∩I0
hT(I) +
∑
I=[s,t]∈J ′
T
∩I0
p′
T
([w, t])
1 + ǫ
,
where the last inequality follows by (5). Summing all these together gives (ii) and
concludes the proof of the lemma. 
Proof of Lemma 4. Consider the pair of intervals {ai, bi} for each i = 1, · · · , 4.
The maximum profit that can be obtained from such a pair is 2, which is obtained
by setting either p(ei) = 1, or p(ei) = 2. Any other price clearly yields a smaller
profit. Similarly if we consider only the intervals of type D, the maximum profit
is obtained by setting p(e2) + p(e3) = 2, or p(e2) + p(e3) = 4. This gives us 4
price vectors that give us maximum profit from all except the type C intervals, viz.
(1, 1, 1, 1), (2, 2, 2, 2), (1, 2, 2, 1), (2, 1, 1, 2). In the first case, we only obtain a profit of
4 from the type C intervals for a total profit of 16, while in the second case, we exceed
the budget of both the type C intervals giving us a profit of only 12. Thus there are
only two profit maximizing price assignments.  
Proof of Lemma 5. Consider the gadget for variable xi. If the gadget is consistent,
we see that both the consistency gadget, and the type H interval spend their entire
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budget, and we obtain a profit of 2mn2+6(2i−2)+6+36. Suppose B1i is TRUE and
B2i is FALSE. Then, we are forced to set the price of edge h to mn
2−1, otherwise the
consistency gadget is unable to purchase it’s edges and we lose at least mn2 +6(2i−
2)+6 from the total profit. However, by setting p(h) = mn2−1, the maximum profit
we obtain is at most (mn2 − 1) + mn2 + 6(2i − 2) + 36, which is smaller than the
maximum profit by 1 unit. On the other hand, if B1i is FALSE, and B
2
i is TRUE, we
lose 1 unit from the maximum profit since we cannot raise the price of edge h to more
than mn2, and the consistency gadget is unable to spend it’s entire budget. Hence,
the maximum profit is obtained only when the variable gadget is consistent. 
Proof of Lemma 6. Consider a consistent price assignment, with the edge h having
a price of n2 and a clause (xi ∨ xj). If the clause (xi ∨ xj) is not satisfied, then the
gadgets for variables xi and xj have a FALSE price assignment, and the prices for
the edges in the gadgets for xi and xj are 2, 1, 1, 2, and 2, 1, 1, 2 respectively. Then,
it is easy to see that the price of the bundle of the clause interval in this case is
mn2+6(i+ j− 2)+ 4, exceeding the budget of the clause interval. In the other three
cases, the price of the bundle is at most mn2 + 6(i + j − 2) + 3, and the profit from
the clause interval is at least mn2+6(i+ j− 2) + 2 (In the case when both xi and xj
are TRUE, the profit is mn2+6(i+ j−2)+2, in the two other satisfying assignments
the profit is mn2+6(i+ j−2)+3). The proofs for the other types of clauses (xi∨xj),
(xi ∨ xj), and (xi ∨ xj) are similar.  
Proof of Theorem 7. Suppose the instance of MAX-2-SAT has k satisfied clauses.
We set the prices for the edges corresponding to the two basic gadgets corresponding
to the variable xi to TRUE if xi = 1 and FALSE otherwise. We set the price of edge
h to n2. This gives a total profit of
S = T · 36n + T ·
n∑
i=1
(mn2 + 6(2i− 2) + 6) + T ·mn2 + kmn2 +O(kn)
The first term of the sum comes from the basic gadgets of each variable set to TRUE
or FALSE, the second term comes from the consistency gadgets, the third term comes
from the H intervals, and the last two terms, from the satisfied clause gadgets.
To show the reverse direction, consider a price assignment that achieves a profit of
at least S. We claim that in an optimal price assignment, the gadgets corresponding
to the variables are all consistent, and the edge h has a price of mn2. Note first that
the maximum profit we can gain from all the clauses is O(m2n2). Now, if we have
larger than, say T = m3n2 copies of each variable gadget, it follows from Lemma
5 that we only lose by making either the variable gadgets inconsistent, or if the H
intervals and the consistency gadgets do not spend their entire budget. Hence, in the
optimal solution, the variables are consistent, and h has a price of mn2. This then
leaves only the clause intervals. Note that our profit maximizing pricing will try to
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maximize the number of clause intervals satisfied, since the clause intervals differ by
at most O(n) in their budgets, but their individual budgets themselves are at least
mn2. By the obvious assignment of truth values to the variables from the variable
price assignment, we get an assignment that satisfies k clauses. 
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Appendix B: The gadgets used in the NP-hard construc-
tion
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Figure 6: The clause gadget for clause (xi ∨ xj)
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Figure 7: The clause gadget for clause (xi ∨ xj)
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Figure 8: The clause gadget for clause (xi ∨ xj)
e4e1 e2 e3
2 2 1
a1 a2 a3 a4
2 1 1 2
b1 b2 b3 b4
3 3
c1 c2
4
d2
2
d
1
f1f4 f3 f2
2 2 1
a1 a2 a3 a4
2 1 1 2
b1 b2 b3 b4
3 3
c1 c2
4
d2
2
d
1
xjxi
mn2 + 6(i+ j − 2) + 9
xi
W
xj
Figure 9: The clause gadget for clause (xi ∨ xj)
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